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Abstract
Death may be defined as the absence of life.” However, this type of
circular definition is only as concrete as the corollary term itself.
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Death may be defined as the absence of life." However, this type of
circular definition is only as concrete as the corollary term itself. The
tragedy faced by the Quinlan family in 19762 focused the attention of
the entire country on the need for a realistic definition of death within
which both the medical and legal professions could operate.3 Legisla-
tures and the judiciary have attempted to establish a framework within
which both professions can function effectively without infringing on
the rights of the dead or dying patient.
Advances in medical technology have necessitated a change in per-
spective of the concept of death. The purpose of this paper is to ex-
amine this shift and to enumerate the ways in which the legislatures
and the courts have attempted to define death. Finally, the paper will
distinguish between the person who meets the definitional standard of
death and the person whom the medical and legal professions will allow
to die.5
Traditionally, death has been viewed as an event in time,5 the oc-
currence of which triggers such legal issues as inheritance, property
rights, and liability under insurance contracts.7 Until recently, the de-
1. Victor, Brain Death: An Overview, 27 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 37, 38 (1980).
2. In re Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super. 227, 348 A.2d 801 (Ch. Div. 1975), rev'd, 70
N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
922 (1976).
3. Victor, supra note 1, at 38.
4. Collester, Death, Dying and the Law: A Prosecutorial View of the Quinlan
Case, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 304 (1977). Dawben, Prometheus Revisited: Popular
Myths, Medical Realities and Legislative Actions Concerning Death, 5 J. HEALTH
POL., POL'Y & L. 250 (1980). Comment, North Carolina's Natural Death Act: Con-
fronting Death With Dignity, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 771 (1978).
5. Capron & Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standards for Determining
Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U. PENN. L. REV. 87 (1972).
6. See Hoffman & Van Cura, Death - Five Brain Criteria, 1978 MED. TRIAL
TECH. Q. 377, 378 (1978).
7. In re Bowman, 94 Wash. 2d 407, 617 P.2d 731, 734 (1980) (en banc). Ufford,
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termination of the time of death has been relatively straight forward
both medically and legally.8 "When the heart stopped beating and the
lungs stopped breathing, the individual was dead according to physi-
cians and according to the law."
When the question did arise as to the viability of an individual,
courts made the determination based on the then universally accepted
criteria of heartbeat and respiration. 10 These criteria were not statu-
tory, but had developed as part of the common law, with many courts
quoting directly from Black's Law Dictionary.1'
"With the recent advancement of medical science, the traditional
common law 'heart and lung' definition is no longer adequate." 2 Mod-
ern equipment, such as respirators and dialysis machines, and surgical
procedures, such as organ transplants, can now prolong the life of a
patient who at an earlier period would have died. 13 The situation cre-
ated by the inadequacy of the traditional definition can be best illus-
trated by reference to the issues raised in relation to heart transplants.
A donor's cardiac function can be maintained mechanically for an in-
definite period of time. If the physician removes the heart from the
donor while it is still beating, albeit mechanically, the physician may be
liable for homicide.14 However, if the donor's heart is not maintained
mechanically and the heart stops beating, the physician would be ab-
solved of any liability but the operation would be useless.' 5
The advent of life-sustaining support mechanisms has shifted our
perspective in relation to the concept of death. Death can no longer be
viewed by the legal profession as a single event in time, but must be
Brain Death/Termination of Heroic Efforts to Save Life - Who Decides?, 19 WAsH-
BURN L.J. 225 (1980).
8. Victor, supra note 1, at 39.
9. 94 Wash. 2d at -, 617 P.2d at 734.
10. Victor, supra note 1, at 50.
11. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (4th ed. 1951) defines death as "the cessa-
tion of life; the ceasing to exist; defined by physicians as total stoppage of the circula-
tion of the blood, and a cessation of the animal and vital functions consequent thereon,
such as respiration, pulsation, etc." But see, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 360 (5th ed.
1979) which references Brain Death at 170.
12. 94 Wash. 2d at -, 617 P.2d at 734.
13. Hoffman & Van Cura, supra note 6, at 377.
14. Id. at 381.
15. Ufford, supra note 7, at 227.
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2
Nova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 7
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol5/iss3/7
Definition of Death 473 
1
seen in the same light as in the medical community, as a "continuing
process of gradual change."1 Recognizing the distinction between the
clinical death of the person as an individual and biological death of
cells and tissues which may continue to deteriorate over a period of
time, 7 medical science has tried to determine the point at which the
"process of death becomes irreversible."1 8 Since the cessation of either
the cardiac or the respiratory system is now frequently a treatable con-
dition, 19 the use of either one as the criteria to determine when the
process of death has become irreversible will just as frequently be in-
conclusive. In those cases in which the 'heart-lung' criteria are inappli-
cable, the medical profession replaces them with brain death criteria.
"Brain death is used to describe a state where there is irreversible de-
struction to the entire brain despite the continuance of cardiac
activity. '20
Although technical medical distinctions are beyond the scope of
this paper, it is necessary to have an elementary understanding of the
organization of the nervous system.2' Functionally speaking, the ner-
vous system may be divided into three levels: (1) the spinal cord level,
(2) the lower brain level (including the brain stem), and (3) the higher
brain or cortical level. The lower brain level is the pathway between the
spinal cord and the cortex.22 It is the reflex center of the brain and
controls the cardiac, vasomotor and respiratory functions.28 The lower
brain level is considered the subconscious control area, the destruction
of which causes the loss of vital body functions resulting inevitably in
death.24 The higher brain or cortical level is a vast storage area. The
human cortex contains the qualities which are unique to mankind and
which make the human being a cognitive, sapient individual.25 If all or
16. Id. at 230.
17. Victor, supra note 1, at 39.
18. Ufford, supra note 7, at 230.
19. Victor, supra note 1, at 39.
20. Id. at 45. Florida has recently enacted a brain death statute. See FLA. STAT.
§ 382.085 (Supp. 1980).
21. Hoffman & Van Cura, supra note 6, 385-86.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Victor, supra note 1, at 48.
25. Ufford, supra note 7, at 228.
15:1981
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a significant portion of the cortex is destroyed, a vegetative state will
result in which the reflex center of the lower brain maintains vital body
functions but all cognitive function is lost.26
In 1968 the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School
pointed out the need for the recognition of brain death as a standard.27
Although the six criteria that this committee established for irreversi-
ble coma 28 "have been found to be inadequate in practice and have
been superceded by various other. . . criteria," 29 they were relied on in
the Quinlan case 0 and continue to be cited in the most recent cases.31
No single criteria is determinative and multiple, realistic parameters
can be developed to establish the absence of cortical and brain stem
activity, 32 since both functions must be absent for a diagnosis of brain
death.
Several states, including Florida in 1980, have adopted statutory
definitions of brain death33 which eliminate uncertainty and avoid ret-
26. Victor, supra note 1, at 48.
27. Hoffman & Van Cura, supra note 6, at 382.
28. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School To Ex-
amine the Definition of Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J. A.M.A. 337
(1968) lists the necessary criteria as:
(1) Unreceptivity and unresponsivity to externally applied stimuli;
(2) No movement of breathing;
(3) No reflexes;
(4) A flat electroencephalogram;
(5) Repetition of tests in 25 hours; and
(6) No evidence of hypothermia or central nervous system depressants.
Id. at 338-40.
29. Hoffman & Van Cura, supra note 6, at 392-93 states that flat EEG is not
determinative and has been replaced by angiography. Victor, supra note 1, at 46 states
that spinal cord reflexes may be present even when the patient is brain dead.
30. 70 N.J. at -, 355 A.2d 652, 656.
31. See note 73 infra.
32. Victor, supra note 1, at 48.
33. 1979 ALA. ACTS 165; ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.120 (Supp. 1979); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 82-537 (1977); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (Deering 1975); CONN.
PUBLIC ACT 79-556; FLA. STAT. § 382.085 (Supp. 1980); GA. COD1 § 88-1715.1
(1975); HAWAI REV. STAT. § 327C-1 (Supp. 1980); IDAHO CODE § 54-1819 (1979);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 552 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975); IOWA CODE § 702.8 (West
1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1974); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 9-111
(West Supp. 1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 54F (1980); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
333.1021 (1980); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 50-22-101 (1979); NEV. REV. STATS. §
4
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rospective determination of the rights and duties of the parties in-
volved." These advantages outweigh the fear that the statutes would be
poorly drafted or biased in favor of transplantation. 5
Kansas was the first state to pass a brain death statute in 1974.36
It recognizes the absence of cardiac-respiratory functions and, alterna-
tively, the absence of spontaneous brain function as the standards for
determining death. Whether either of the statutory standards has been
met, is "based on the ordinary standards of medical practice."37 Both
the alternative standards and the lack of specific medical criteria were
451.007 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-4 (Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322
(Cum. Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 1-301 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 146.087
(1977); TENN. CODE ANN. 53-459 (1977); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. § 4447 (Vernon
Supp. 1980); VA. CODE § 54-325.7; W. VA. CODE § 16-19-1 (Supp. 1980); Wyo.
STAT. § 35-19-101 (Supp. 1980); Hereinafter, Statutes.
34. Ufford, supra note 7, at 234-35.
35. Id. at 231.
36. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (1977), which provides:
A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the opinion of the
physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the absence
of spontaneous respiratory and cardiac function and because of the disease or
condition which caused, directly or indirectly, these functions to cease, or be-
cause of the passage of time since these functions ceased, attempts at resuscita-
tion are considered hopeless; and, in the event, death will have occurred at the
time these functions ceased; or
A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the opinion of a
physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the absence
of spontaneous brain function; and if based on ordinary standards of medical
practice, during reasonable attempts to either maintain or restore spontaneous
circulatory or respiratory function in the absence of aforesaid brain function it
appears that further attempts at resuscitation or supportive maintenance will not
succeed, death will have occurred at the time when these conditions first coin-
cide. Death is to be pronounced before artificial means of supporting respiratory
and circulatory function are terminated and before any vital organ is removed
for purpose of transplantation.
These alternative definitions of death are to be utilized for all purposes in
this state, including trials of civil and criminal cases, any laws to the contrary
notwithstanding.
The 1979 revision changed the last sentence in the second paragraph to read: "Death is
to be pronounced before any vital organ is removed for purposes of transplantation."
Id. (Supp." 1980).
37. Id.
5
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approved by the Kansas Supreme Court in State v. Shaffer"8 which
held that the Kansas brain death statute was constitutional.
Capron & Kass"9 have criticized the Kansas statute for going be-
yond a simple definition of death"0 and establishing the "misconception
that there are two separate phenomena of death."'1 Their statutory
proposal,'2 which has been adopted by eight states, would "provide two
standards gauged by different functions, for measuring different mani-
festations of the same phenomenon.' 3 The "irreversible cessation of
spontaneous brain functions" standard would be applicable only when
"artificial means of support preclude" the use of the "irreversible cessa-
tion of spontaneous respiratory and circulatory functions" standard."
"Irreversible cessation of spontaneous brain functions" is intended to
include both cortical and brain stem activity. A patient who has no
cortical activity but retains some brain stem activity would be excluded
from the statutory standard.45 "The condition of 'neo-cortical death'
may well be a proper justification for interrupting all forms of treat-
ment and allowing those patients to die, but this moral and legal prob-
lem cannot and should not be settled by 'defining' these people as
'dead.' "146
Montana and Tennessee 4 adopted the model statute approved by
38. State v. Shaffer, 223 Kan. 244, 574 P.2d 205 (1977).
39. Alexander Morgan Capron is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University
of Pennsylvania. Leon R. Kass is the Executive Secretary on the Committee on Life
Sciences and Social Policy, National Research Council - National Academy of Sci-
ences. Capron & Kass, supra note 5, at 87.
40. Id. at 110, 115, 117.
41. Id. at 109.
42. Id. at 111 provides:
A person will be considered dead if in the announced opinion of a physician,
based on ordinary standards of medical practice, he has experienced an irreversi-
ble cessation of spontaneous respiratory and circulatory functions. In the event
that artificial means of support preclude a determination that these functions
have ceased, a person will be considered dead if in the announced opinion of a
physician, he has experienced an irreversible cessation of spontaneous brain func-
tions. Death will have occurred at the time when the relevant functions ceased.
43. Id. at 112.
44. Id. at 111.
45. Id. at 115.
46. Id.
47. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 50-22-101 (1981): "Definition of death. A
6
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the American Bar Association in 1975.48 This model does away with
the cardiac-respiratory standard entirely and relies solely on the "irre-
versible cessation of total brain functions. '49 Nevada adopted the Uni-
form Brain Death Act.50 The language of this model has the advantage
of specifically excluding any brain stem function from the scope of the
statute. Along with the American Bar Association model, the Uniform
Brain Death Act excludes the cardiac-respiratory standard. The lan-
guage is no longer part of the statute and has been relegated to the
commissioners' comments which state that "the act does not preclude a
determination of death under other legal or medical criteria, including
the additional criteria of cessation of respiration and circulation."51
Several states, which have not adopted a statutory definition of
brain death, have adopted the brain death standard judicially. The
Massachusetts Supreme Court52 approved a jury instruction in a mur-
der trial which stated that
as a matter of law, the occurrence of a brain death, if you find it, satis-
fies the essential element of the crime of murder requiring proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of the death of the victim. Brain death occurs when,
in the opinion of a licensed physician, based on ordinary and accepted
standards of medical practice, there has been a total and irreversible ces-
I
human body with irreversible cessation of total brain function, as determined according
to usual and customary standards of medical practice, is dead for all legal purposes."
TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-459 (1980): "Death defined. - For all legal purposes, a
human body, with irreversible cessation of total brain function, according to the usual
and customary standards of medical practice, shall be considered dead." See statutes
cited in note 33 supra.
48. "For all legal purposes, a human body with irreversible cessation of total
brain functions, according to the usual and customary standards of medical practice,
shall be considered dead." House of Delegates Redefines Death, Urges Redefinition of
Rape, and Undoes the Houston Amendment, 61 A.B.A.J. 464 (1975).
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. NEV. REv. STAT. § 451.007 (1980). UNIFORM BRAIN DEATH AcT, 12 U.L.A.
15 (Supp. 1981): § 1. (Brain Death)
For legal and medical purposes, an individual who has sustained irreversible cessa-
tion of all functioning of the brain stem, is dead. A determination under this section
must be made in accordance with reasonable medical standards."
51. Id.
52. Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249, 366 N.E.2d 744 (1977), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978).
Definition of DeathI 5:1981
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sation of spontaneous brain functions and further attempts at resuscita-
tion or continued supportive maintenance would not be successful in re-
storing such functions.53
The murder victim demonstrated neither cortical nor brain stem activ-
ity and was pronounced dead in accordance with the Harvard criteria
for brain death. His removal from the respirator which artificially
maintained circulation and respiration was "in accordance with good
medical practice."'" The court held that the trial judge had merely
taken into account technical advances in medical science in forming his
instruction.
In Lovato v. District Court,5 5 the Supreme Court of Colorado
stated that the prime issue before it was the "proper definition of
death."5' A young child-abuse victim "sustained cerebral death as evi-
denced by total lack of brain activity in both the cortex and the brain
stem."' 57 The district court ordered the child's guardians ad litem to
authorize the child's physician to remove all extraordinary devices as
the child was already dead. On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court
adopted the provisions of the Uniform Brain Death Act,58 but did not
preclude "continuing recognition of the standard of death as deter-
mined by traditional criteria of cessation of respiration and circula-
tion."5 9 The effect of the decision is to provide for "alternative determi-
nations of death."6
In In re Bowman, the Washington Supreme Court held that it is
for the law to define the standard of death and for the medical profes-
sion to determine the applicable criteria for deciding when death is pre-
sent. 1 In this case, the child-abuse victim was pronounced brain dead
and tbe hospital was enjoined from removing the artificial life support
systems to give the child's guardian ad litem time to appeal the trial
53. Id. at -, 366 N.E.2d at 747-48.
54. Id. at -, 366 N.E.2d at 747.
55. Lovato v. District Court, 601 P.2d 1072 (Colo. 1980) (en banc).
56. Id. at 1075.
57. Id. at 1074.
58. Id. at 1081. See note 51.
59. 601 P.2d at 1081.
60. Ashman, What's New in the Law, 66 A.B.A. J. 211, 212 (Feb. 1980).
61. 94 Wash. 2d at -, 617 P.2d at 732, 738.
8
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court's adoption of the "irreversible loss of brain function standard." 2
All of the victim's bodily functions had ceased before the Washington
Supreme Court was able to hear the case. However, because of the
importance of the question presented, the Court issued a decision in the
technically moot case."3
The Court was careful to distinguish brain death from a "persis-
tent vegetative state."'" In order for brain death to occur there must be
total cessation of both cortical and brain stem functions. The issue then
becomes whether brain death is a recognized standard of death in the
State of Washington. 5 The issues involved are entirely different when
there is some brain stem activity even in the total absence of cortical
activity. This condition is known as vegetative coma and a person in
this condition is not brain dead according to any accepted medical
criteria. 6
The Washington Supreme Court decision is limited to the adop-
tion of a brain death standard. That Court rejected the Uniform Brain
Death Act adopted in Lovato v. District Court67 because it failed to
interrelate the traditional standards with the new brain functions stan-
dard.68 Instead, the Washington Court adopted the provisions of the
Uniform Determination of Death Act recommendation69 which returns
to the alternative standards of the Kansas Statute70 and includes the
clarification as to brain stem function found in the Uniform Brain
Death Act.71
While the legislative or judicial adoption of definition of death
which is predicated on a brain functions standard deals with some of
the problems created by the.recent advances in medical technology, it
does not even address the issue of neo-cortical death which is raised by
62. Id. at _, 617 P.2d at 734.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 617 P.2d at 735.
65. Id. at 617 P.2d at 737.
66. Id.
67. 601 P.2d 1072.
68. Contra, id. at 1081 provides that the traditional criteria of respiration and
circulation continue to be recognized.
69. Wash. 2d at ..,617 P.2d at 735.
70. See text of KAN. STAT. ANN., supra note 36.
71. See text of UNIFORM BRAIN DEATH ACT, supra note 50.
9
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In re Quinlan 7 and its progeny.78 In the view of Capron & Kass, the
issues of brain death and when a person is pronounced dead should be
clearly distinguished from the issues of neo-cortical death and when a
person should be allowed to die.74 Several states have passed Natural
Death Acts which endorse the concept of the "living will" in order to
deal with the problems associated with the withdrawal of artificial life-
support systems.71 These cumbersome statutes fail to distinguish be-
tween life-prolonging and life-saving procedures and deal only with the
competent adult who could invoke his constitutional right of privacy to
refuse treatment even without the statute.78
The courts, while themselves denouncing the legislative failure in
dealing with neo-cortical death, have attacked the issue head on and
attempted to fill the legislative vacuum in this area.77 The seminal case
is In re Quinlan." On the night of April 15, 1975, Karen Ann Quinlan
ceased breathing for at least two fifteen minute periods79 and suffered
neo-cortical death. In other words, Karen Ann Quinlan was in a chron-
ic vegetative state. While she showed no evidence of cortex function,
she did show evidence of brain stem activity. Under the brain death
criteria discussed previously, Karen Ann Quinlan was alive although
she would never be restored to "cognitive or sapient life." 80 The New
Jersey Supreme Court allowed Ms. Quinlan's father to invoke Ms.
Quinlan's right of privacy in a "substituted judgment." 81 In accordance
with the framework set out by the court for the exercise of that right,82
72. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647.
73. Severn v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980); Satz
v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff/d, 379 So. 2d 359
(Fla. 1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Spring, - Mass. -, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); Eicher v.
Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980).
74. Capron & Kass, supra note 5.
75. See generally, Comment, supra note 4.
76. See generally, Dawben, supra note 4.
77. Contra, Ufford, supra note 7, who argues that the courts are the most appro-
priate place to deal with neo-cortical death.
78. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647.
79. Id. at _, 355 A.2d 653-54.
80. Id. at _, 355 A.2d at 655.
81. Id. at _, 355 A.2d at 664-66.
82. Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 672.
10
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Mr. Quinlan had all extraordinary, life-prolonging machinery (i.e., res-
pirator) withdrawn from his daughter.8
Although the Quinlan court touched on many of the issues that
would be more fully developed by the cases which followed,8' it mainly
developed the right of privacy, the mechanism through which that right
could be exercised, and a framework for the relief granted. The Quin-
lan court relied on Justice Douglas' opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut
which found the unwritten constitutional right of privacy to exist in the
penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. 85 The "emana-
tions from those guarantees"86 give life and substance to a right which
is broad enough to "encompass a woman's decision to terminate preg-
nancy under certain conditions" 87 and, by analogy, "broad enough to
encompass a patient's decision to decline medical treatment under cer-
tain circumstances."88 The invocation of the constitutional right to pri-
vacy triggers a balancing of the right of the individual against the in-
terest of the state in preservation of the sanctity of human life. The
state's interest "weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows as
the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims. Ulti-
mately there comes a point at which the individual's rights overcome
the [s]tate interest." 89 At that point the individual may exercise his
constitutional right of privacy.
The Quinlan court then decided that the rights of a comatose indi-
vidual could be exercised through the doctrine of "substituted judg-
ment" under the court's equity power.90 "The only practical way to
prevent the destruction of the right is to permit the guardian and fam-
ily . . . to render their best judgment, . as to whether she would
exercise it in these circumstances." 1
83. Id. at _, 355 A.2d at 664-66.
84. E.g., a few of the issues not emphasized in this paper include standing, life-
saving vs. life-prolonging treatment, the Catholic viewpoint, and cognitive vs. biological
existence.
85. 70 N.J. at , 355 A.2d at 663, citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
86. 381 U.S. at 484.
87. 70 N.J. aL, 355 A.2d at 663 citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
88. Id. at , 355 A.2d at 663.
89. Id. at , 355 A.2d at 664.
90. Id. at , 355 A.2d at 666.
91. Id. at ... , 355 A.2d at 664.
481 1Definition of Death5:1981
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The framework developed by the court eliminated the need for ju-
dicial decision in this type of case when the family, guardian, attending
physician and hospital "Ethics Committee" all agree that there is no
"reasonable possibility" of the individual emerging from a comatose
condition to a cognitive, sapient state. 2 At that point the life-support
systems may be withdrawn without any civil or criminal liability on the
part of any of the participants.9"
The next two cases which helped to develop this area of the law,
Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz9 and Satz v. Perlmut-
ter,9 5 do not deal with neo-cortical death but rather with the right of
the guardian of a mentally retarded adult and the right of a competent,
terminally ill adult to refuse life-prolonging treatment. Saikewicz held
that the "substantive rights of the competent and the incompetent per-
son are the same in regard to the right to decline potentially life-pro-
longing treatment '"" because of the value of human dignity.Y
Saikewicz also adopted the mechanism of "substituted judgment" and
went to great pains to make it clear that the primary test is a subjective
one.98 "[T]he goal is to determine with as much accuracy as possible
the wants and needs of the individual involved."99
The primary importance of Saikewicz to the present discussion is
that it sets out the state's interests °" which are to be balanced against
the individual's right of privacy, and it rejects what it views as the
92. Id. at _, 355 A.2d at 671. "The evidence in this case convinces us that the
focal point of decision should be the prognosis as to the reasonable possibility of return
to cognitive and sapient life, as distinguished from the forced continuance of that bio-
logical vegetative existence to which Karen seems to be doomed." Id. at _, 355 A.2d at
669.
93. Id. at , 355 A.2d at 671.
94. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
95. 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla.
1980).
96. 373 Mass. at _, 370 N.E.2d at 423 (except that the incompetent individual
may require more procedural safeguards).
97. Id. at , 370 N.E.2d at 427.
98. Id. at __, 370 N.E.2d at 430-31.
99. Id.
100. The four state interests identified in Saikewicz are: (1) the preservation of
life; (2) the protection of third parties; (3) the prevention of suicide; and (4) the ethical
integrity of the medical profession. Id. at _, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
12
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Quinlan court's abdication of its responsibility to make the final deci-
sion in this type of case. Both of these points have been cited with
approval in subsequent cases.101 The balancing, of course, is a factual
determination.
As to the second point, the Saikewicz court took "a dim view of
any attempt to shift the ultimate decision-making responsibility away
from the duly established courts of proper jurisdiction to any commit-
tee, panel or group, ad hoc or permanent. 102 Satz v. Perimutter is
significant in that it clearly draws the distinction, alluded to in the pre-
vious cases, between life-saving treatment and life-prolonging
treatment.103
In seeking to protect the rights of an individual who has suffered
neo-cortical death, the court may derive its subject matter jurisdiction
from a statute, under the state's parens patriae powers over an incom-
petent or under the more fundamental principle of equity jurisdic-
tion.104 Further, the court has the obligation to exercise that power,
even in the absence of enabling legislation, when it is faced with a "vi-
tal problem involving private rights. 105
The relief sought may be based on the common law right of bodily
determination or on the constitutional right to privacy.106 Since "com-
mon-law rights can be abrogated by statute in the exercise of the
[s]tate's police powers subject only to due process requirements,"10 7 it
is more effective to grant the relief sought on the basis of a constitu-
tional right which "cannot be so abrogated."108 The "state action" nec-
essary to apply the right of privacy through the mechanism of the four-
101. E.g., Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359; Eicher, 73 A.D.2d 431,426 N.Y.S.2d 517
(1980).
102. 373 Mass. at ., 370 N.E.2d at 434; however, In re Spring, - Mass. ., 405
N.E.2d 115 (1980), limited this to cases which had been brought before a court of
competent jurisdiction at the outset.
103. 362 So. 2d at 163.
104. Eicher v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d at , 426 N.Y.S.2d at 534. The New York
Supreme Court in Eicher issued a decision in a technically moot case in order to de-
velop "the structural legal framework for reaching similar termination-of-treatment de-
cisions." Id. at , 426 N.Y.S.2d at 524.
105. Id. at , 426 N.Y.S.2d at 534.
106. Id. at , 426 N.Y.S.2d at 540.
107. Id. at , 426 N.Y.S.2d at 540-41.
108. Id. at , 426 N.Y.S.2d at 541.
483 1
13
Janov: Toward A Legally And Medically Acceptable Definition of Death
Published by NSUWorks, 1981
teenth amendment can be found in the nexus between the relief sought
and the state's interest in its homicide statutes, hospital regulations and
parens patriae responsibility to protect incompetents. 10 9
To conclude that an individual has "a right to refuse medical
treatment necessarily implies that there exists a corresponding capabil-
ity to exercise that right."" 0 However, there are certain medical crite-
ria necessary to activate the individual's right. "He must be terminally
ill; he must be in a [chronic or irreversible] vegetative coma . . .; he
must lack cognitive brain function; and the probability [that such]...
cognitive function [will return] must be extremely remote.""' Unless
these criteria are met, the state's interest in the preservation of human
life will outweigh the individual's right to privacy.1 2
The court in Eicher v. Dillon"3 approved the mechanism of "sub-
stituted judgment" to determine the subjective desire of the comatose
individual." 4 It further approved the admission of previous specific
statements of intent by the now comatose individual." 5 Finally, the
Eicher court combined the Quinlan procedure with the Saikewicz re-
quirement that the neutral presence of the law make the final
determination." 6
The most recent case, Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center,
Inc.," 7 is the classic neo-cortical death case. Mrs. Severns had suffered
extensive damage to her cortex but her brain stem continued to evi-
dence activity. The Delaware Supreme Court technically followed the
legal framework developed by the Eicher court and found that Mr.
Severns was to be appointed guardian and after a proper evidentiary
hearing, was entitled to such relief as the evidence warranted." 8
In conclusion, it is clear that the rapid advancement of medical
109. Id. at , 426 N.Y.S.2d at 540. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419
U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
110. Id. at _, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 544.
111. Id. at _, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 545.
112. Id.
113. 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980).
114. Id. at , N.Y.S.2d at 547.
115. Id.
116. Id. at ._, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 548-51.
117. 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980).
118. Id. at 1349-50.
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technology has obfuscated the concept of death. Statutory definitions
adopting the brain death standard are preferable to judicial adoption of
the standard, especially when the statutes are flexible and recognize the
need to allow for changing medical criteria. But these statutes are only
a first step; it is necessary to deal with the individual who has suffered
neo-cortical death but fails to meet the brain death standard. Although
the courts are beginning to develop a realistic framework, within which
both the legal and medical professions can operate with relative cer-
tainty, judicial determination of this issue is much too cumbersome. A
comprehensive legislative package which could be adopted uniformly
throughout the country, is a goal that will not be realized in the very
near future. However, as technology advances, it will be incumbent on
the legislature to act to protect the fundamental rights of the
individual.
Cynthia L. Janov
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